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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAHL RAY POWELL and 
BONNIE RAE POWELL, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
11133 
Appeal from Summary Judgment for debt in favor 
of Plaintiff Pioneer Finance & Thrift Company in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. Hon. Stewart M. Hanson, Judge. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 18, 1967, Pioneer Finance and Thrift 
Company brought an action against Dahl Ray Powell 
and Bonnie Rae Powell, his wife, to recover on a 
note and chattel mortgage signed by the Defend-
ants (Appellants here) during an appointment at 
the Plaintiff's office (Respondent here) on Septem-
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ber 6, 1966, which appointment had been made be. 
tween the Plaintiff and Defendants by one Melvin 
A. Stanley, dba Stanley Furniture and Appliance. 
In addition to the claim for debt, the Plaintiff also 
alleged that the Defendants had obtained money 
from the Plaintiff by false pretenses. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
On Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
Plaintiff, a hearing was held in the Third Judicial 
District Court before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, Judge, which hearing resulted in a judg. 
ment for the Plaintiff for the debt claimed against 
the Defendants but denied judgment on Plaintiff's 
allegation that the Defendants had obtained money 
by false pretenses. It is from the Summary Judgment 
for debt which the Defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of judgment against 
them for debt on the grounds of fraud in the induce-
ment; failure of the Respondent to act in good faith 
to avoid an unconscionable contract; failure of a 
condition precedent; want or failure of considera: 
tion; and remand for trial of the case on the ground 
that the Appellants' allegations of fraud and faihm 
of consideration were such as to require factual 
determination by trial before judgments for debt 
could properly be rendered against them. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 6, 1966, Melvin A. Stanley, here-
inafter referred to as "Stanley" made an appoint-
ment with the Respondent, Pioneer Finance and 
Thrift Co., hereinafter designated as "Pioneer", for 
the Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Dahl Ray Powell, here-
inafter designated as "The Powells" to go to Pio-
neer's office and sign a note and chattel mortgage. 
Pursuant to the appointment made by Stanley, the 
Powells went to Pioneer's office and executed com-
mercial paper contemplated by Stanley's making 
the appointment. 
Since an important part of the defense against 
collection of that note by Pioneer involves an alleged 
wide-spread fraudulent plan engaged in by Stanley, 
some history of Stanley and description of his modus 
operendi which describe the "commercial setting" 
in which the Powells contracted to pay money to Pio-
neer will be of more than passing interest to this 
Court. 
Melvin A. Stanley established a business of 
which he was the proprietor known as Stanley Fur-
niture and Appliance, located at 779 East Third 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, sometime in 1955 or 
1956. (R 22) 
Though Stanley's business with his customers 
appears to have been legitimate until about 1962, his 
payment record with his creditors from the time 
he began his appliance business until 1964 grew 
steadily worse. Between 1957 and 1964, fourteen 
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suits for n?n-payment of debt were filed against 
Stanley which resulted in eleven unsatisfied judg. 
ments against him. Five of the judgments wert 
obta~ned by finance companies, one such judgment 
was m excess of $30,000.00. (R 22) 
The fact of Stanley's i1isolvency was known fr, 
the finance compardes through routine inquiry to 
the Salt Lake Credit Bureau, Dun & Bradstreet, or 
their own "Lenders Exchange." Such infornwtioi• 
was not available to his customers [such as tht 
Powells]. (R 22) 
It is apparent that beginning in about 1962, 
when Stanley closed his bank account and began 
transacting all his business with cash, Stanley's cred-
itors were about to close his doors unless he could 
come up with some cash. Consequently, at that time, 
he conceived the idea that he could generate work· 
ing capital to meet the pressing claims which, if not 
paid, would close his doors, by inducing some of hi~ 
old customers to sign conditional sale contracts at 
his place of business, which Stanley could sell to 
finance companies and generate immediate cash for 
him, if he delayed purchasing and delivering the fur· 
niture. As is customary with conditional sale con· 
tracts, the finance company furnished Stanley with 
forms which Stanley handled directly for them. 
(R22) 
Beginning in about 1965, most of the finance 
companies [including the Respondent Pioneer] t(i 
whom Stanley had been selling conditional sale con· 
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tracts became sufficiently suspicious of the possibil-
ity that there might be something wrong with Stan-
ley's conditional sale contracts and in order to try 
to insulate themselves from Stanley's plan, began re-
fusing to accept contracts signed in Stanley's store 
and insisted that he "produce the bodies" by having 
his customers come to the finance company offices 
where customers signed notes and chattel mortgages 
in the presence of loan company personnel. ( R 22) 
In order to induce his customers to sign without 
first receiving their furniture, Stanley promised to 
make the payments to the finance companies called 
for by the defendants' note and chattel mortgage. 
All these payments for finance companies, Stanley 
made faithfully until Stanley's bankruptcy in No-
\'ember, 1966. (R 23) 
At first, Stanley made the proposition that he 
would deliver furniture and make finance company 
payments to a few former customers such as 65-year-
old Ladislao Cruz who neither read nor wrote either 
Spanish or English and whose command of spoken 
English was very limited. During the period 1962 to 
1966, Stanley induced Mr. Cruz to sign ten contracts. 
Mr. Cruz did not know which finance company's pa-
per he was signing since he could not .read and Stanley 
made the payments directly to several of the finance 
companies involved. Mr. Stanley delivered all or part 
of the furniture on about half of the contracts Mr. 
Cruz signed and since Cruz was not making the pay-
ments, he felt he was in no position to press Stan-
ley for delivery of the furniture. ( R 23) 
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Following 1962, Stanley gradually enlarged his 
scheme by contacting a number of other Spanish 
speaking former customers who were employed at 
such installations as Kennecott and Ajax Press and 
induced them to sign conditional sale contracts. He 
delivered enough of the furniture, in cases other 
than those at bar, to give credence to his claim that · 
he would deliver furniture and pay the finance com-
panies. ( R 23) 
As the snowballing cost of finance charges and 
high interest and delivering at least part of the 
furniture began to overcome him, Stanley persuaded 
some of his earlier customers to whom he had deliv-
ered furniture and for whom he was making pay-
ments, to become "shills" and induce their fellow 
workers, at first only Spanish speaking but later 
English speaking, to go to finance company offices 
and sign notes and chattel mortgages to pay for 
furniture Stanley promised to deliver. (R 23) (Also 
see Defs.' Deposition, p. 4, 26) 
In each case the new recruit was induced by 
Stanley to remain silent about the arrangements by 
persuading him the scheme was available to only a 
limited few "working men" who Stanley wanted to 
"help." [see Defs.' Deposition p. 27] The arrange-
ment was not available to just anybody. There are 
several cases where two brothers did not know the 
other was involved because the injunction not to tell 
anyone else about his scheme except on Stanley's 
specific instruction was so skillfully and powerfully 
planted by Stanley in his victims' minds. (R 24) 
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It was established in Stanley's bankruptcy hear-
ing that by 1965 and through November, 1966, when 
he filed for bankruptcy, even though Stanley was 
receiving as much as $28,000.00 per month from fi-
nance companies generated by his ever-enlarging 
scheme, he was able only to make the finance com-
pany payments without delivering any or only a 
small part of the promised furniture. 
Thus the finance companies themselves became 
the principal beneficiaries of Stanley's scheme. (R 
24) 
In each case, when one of Stanley's shills would 
contact a prospective customer, he would honestly 
tell the prospect that Stanley had been in business 
for many years; that he and other people he person-
ally knew had received their furniture and that 
Stanley was making the payments. This personal tes-
timony was powerful enough to bring even more 
sophisticated prospects into the scheme. Some did not 
take Mr. Stanley's explanations about kick-backs and 
profitable investments at face value and realizing his 
prices were high, purchased the furniture in the con-
fidence that it would be delivered. They had person-
al testimony of fellow employees that Stanley de-
livered and even though the prices were high and if 
later Stanley was unable to pay off the finance com-
pany, since they were buying furniture they needed 
anyway, they would be able and willing to pay the 
finance company obligations. [see Defs.' Deposition 
p. 26, 39] 
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Stanley did not deliver promised furniture tn 
the Powells in the case at bar and since they had re-
ceived nothing for the note and chattel mortgage 
they had signed, refused to continue payments to 
Pioneer after Stanley quit supplying the money for 
the payments and filed bankruptcy in November, 
1966. (R 25) 
Stanley's bankruptcy petition lists some FIVE 
HUNDRED (500) FAMILIES which he had 
brought into his confidence game and sought to dis-
charge his obligations to them in the amount of ap-
proximately FIVE HUNDRED TH 0 US AND 
($500,000.00) DOLLARS. (R 25) 
It is apparent that Stanley, using the fact that 
he had been in business for many years and by em-
ploying shills who could honestly say they had re-
ceived their furniture and that Stanley was making 
finance company payments, engaged in a highly 
successful confidence scheme against the Powells and 
hundreds of others. ( R 25) 
ARGUMENT ONE 
THE PLAINTIFF PIONEER FINANCE 
COMP ANY IS NOT A PURCHASER FOR 
VALUE, AND NOT A HOLDER OF AN INSTRU-
MENT IN DUE COURSE, CONSEQUENTLY, 
THE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE POW-
ELLS, MELVIN A. STANLEY, AND PIONEER 
MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE AND 
ARE GOVERNED BY ORDINARY SALES OR 
CONTRACT LAW vVHEREUNDER THE NOTE 
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uN 
BECAME 'ENFORCEABLE AGAINST DEFEND-
ANTS BY VIRTUE OF FRAUD IN THE IN-
DUCEMENT [ARGUMENT TWO AND THREE] 
FOR FAILURE OF A CONDITION PRECE-
DENT [ARGUMENT FOUR] AND FOR FAIL-
URE OF CONSIDERATION [ARGUMENT 
FIVE]. 
The transaction between Pioneer and the Pow-
ells wherein the Powells signed a note and chattel 
mortgage with Pioneer as payee took place in Pio-
neer's office on September 6, 1966, more than nine 
months after the effective date of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, which Code enunciates the law 
governing this case. 
By definition, to be a negotiable instrument, a 
writing must conform to the requirements of a 
"Draft" (Bill of Exchange) - "Check", "Certifi-
cate of Deposit" or "Note." [See Sec. 70A-3-104, 
(2) U.C.A.] The chattel mortgage signed by Ap-
pellants does not meet these requirements for nego-
tiable instruments. While the note is a negotiable 
instrument, in this case the note was never nego-
tiated. 
The note was never acquired by an innocent 
purchaser for value; it is still in the hands of Pio-
neer, the original party to the contract, which is 
here bringing suit for its collection. Consequently, 
the Respondent has none of the special protection 
provided for holders in due course provided in the 
Uniform Commercial Code and Section 70A-3-306 
U.C.A. bears directly on this case. 
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"70A-3-306. RIGHTS OF ONE NOT 
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE. - Unless he 
has the rights of a holder in due course any 
person takes the instrument subject to 
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of 
any person ; and 
( b) all defenses of any party which 
would be available in an action on a simple 
contract; and 
( c) the defenses of want or failure of 
consideration, nonperformance of any condi-
tion precedent, nondelivery, or delivery for a 
special purpose .... " [emphasis added] 
Lest there be a lingering doubt whether the 
note, because it is by definition a negotiable instru-
ment should be given by special protection beyond 
that provided by contract law alone, attention is 
called to 44 ALR 2d 31 : 
"It is a well-known rule that in the hands 
of any holder other than a holder in due 
course, a negotiable instrument is subject to 
the same defenses as if it were nonnegotiable. 
8 Am Jur, Bills and Notes§ 355. 
"Under this rule, even if the instrument 
executed by the purchaser to the seller in a 
secured chattel sale transaction is negotiable, 
where the transferee [finance company] suin~ 
thereon is not a holder in due course he orch-
narily is not protected agm·nst def ens es which 
the chattel purchaser-obligor could asse:·t 
against the seller of the chattel. This point is 
supported and illustrated by the numerous 
cases listed in §20 [g], infra, in which a par-
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ticular transferrer was found not to be a hold-
er in due course, and by the following cases, 
which demonstrate its expression and appli-
cation .... " 
A case directly in point wherein the seller of 
the goods failed to make delivery of the goods which 
were promised and the finance company tried to col-
lect on its note despite failure of the dealers war-
ranties, is Mutual Finance Co. v Martin, 63 So 2d 
649, 44 ALR 2d 1, ( 1953) wherein after finding 
that the finance company plaintiff was not a holder 
in due course, the Supreme Court of Florida states 
at 44 ALR 2d 7 : 
"The argument has been advanced by 
appellant that this case should be reversed 
and that this Court should hold the finance 
company to be a holder in due course of the 
note and that personal defenses are unavail-
able against it. Appellant says that unless this 
is done it 'will destroy the long established 
precedent of the State of Florida and thereby 
seriously affect a certain mode of transacting 
business adopted throughout the State in re-
liance thereon.' It may be that our holding 
here will require some changes in business 
methods and will impose a greater burden on 
the finance companies. We think the buyer -
Mr. & Mrs. General Public - should have 
some protection somewhere along the line. We 
believe the finance company is better able to 
bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the 
buyer and in a far better position to protect 
his interests against unscrupulous and insolv-
ent dealers .... 
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"If this opinion imposes great burdens 
on finance companies it is a potent argument 
in favor of a rule which will afford protection 
to the general buying public against unscnt-
puloiis dealers in personal property." [em-
phasis added] 
In the case at bar. the dealer Stanley was like-
wise insolvent and unable to respond in damages. In 
the Mutual Finance Co. case, supra, the dealer did 
deliver some goods, though not as warranted. In the 
case at bar, the dealer Stanley delivered nothing. 
ARGUMENT TWO 
THE POWELLS WERE INDUCED TO SIGN 
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE FOR PIONEER 
AS PART OF ST AN LEY' S WIDESPREAD 
FRAUDULENT SCHEME OR CONFIDENCE 
GAME PERPETRATED ON THEM AND 500 
OTHER UTAH FAMILIES BY M.A. STANLEY, 
DBA STANLEY FURNITURE COMPANY. 
Melvin A. Stanley fraudulently induced the 
Powells to go to Pioneer's office and sign a note and ' 
chattel mortgage for Pioneer. The fraud perpetrated 
by Stanley on the Powells complies with all of the 
requirements of an allegation of fraud as enunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Fisher, 79 U 
115, 120, 8 P2 589 ( 1932) ; Pace v Parrish 122 U 
141, 247 P 2d f73 (1952) and other cases and is set 
forth with particularity as follows: 
(a) Stanley falsely represented to the Appel-
lants that he could and would deliver to them fur-
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niture of their selection and that he could and would 
repay monthly to the finance company the money 
necessary to sa ti sf y their note ; 
(b) Stanley made these fraudulent representa-
tions to the Powells barely two months before filing 
hiB bankruptcy petition, [which petition showed a 
ratio of debt to assets of 600 to 1] knowing his 
representations were false, since though he had been 
able to induce enough new participants in his scheme 
to make the promised cash payments to finance com-
panies until November 10, 1966, he had not been 
able to buy and deliver to his customers all of the 
promised furniture for more than two years prior to 
hi,s bankruptcy petition. In September, 1966, when 
Stanley made his promise to deliver furniture to the 
Powells and make finance company payments, he 
knew his promise to deliver furniture was false be-
cause he had been unable to deliver any furniture 
in the several months prior to September, 1966. His 
bankruptcy petition of November, 1966, showed ap-
proximately $600,000 of debt to $1,000 of assets. 
( c) That Stanley, knowing for more than two 
years that he could not perform all his promises to 
deliver furniture and make finance company pay-
ments, made these false and fraudulent representa-
tions with intention to cheat and defraud the gullible 
Appellants; 
( d) That an actual fraud was perpetrated on 
the Powells in that they signed Notes in reliance on 
Stanley's false representations; Stanley did not ful-
fill his promise to deliver the furniture and since 
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November 10, 1966, did not repay the money re-
quired to satisfy the Pioneer note and left the de-
frauded Powells with an obligation under that note· 
' 
( e) That Stanley, using his position as the per-
son with the most actual knowledge of his business, 
falsely and fraudulently represented to his customers 
that his business operations were profitable and that 
he could perform his promises by virtue of, among 
others, the following reasons: ( i) That he received 
special discounts and rebates from furniture and ap-
pliance suppliers which they paid preferentially to 
Stanley because of his large volume of business with 
them, (ii) that he received money each month as 
fees or kickbacks from the finance companies for 
bringing customers to them, (iii) that the profits 
thus generated were sufficient to pay for furniture 
he promised to deliver and also to repay monthly cash 
sufficient to satisfy their notes, thus inducing his 
customers to sign the notes and turn the proceeds 
over to him in reliance on Stanley's representations. 
(R 33-34) 
While it may be argued that Stanley's promise 
to deliver furniture at a future date did not neces-
sarily constitute a fraud since Stanley might argue 
he intended to fulfill his promises when made, the 
same cannot be aid of his statements that he was 
presently receiving special discounts from manufac-
turers, investing his money in profitable ventures 
and receiving kickbacks from finance companies, all 
clearly mis-statements of existing fact, and which 
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were used by him to induce hi,s customers to enter 
into hi,s scheme. ( R 34) 
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Page v 
Pilot L. Ins. Co. 193 SC 59, 5 SE 2d 454, 125 ALR 
872 ( 1939) holds that even a promise of future per-
formance which, as here, was made as part of a 
general plan may constitute actionable fraud as fol-
lows: 
"A future promise is not fraudulent, un-
less such a future promise was part of a gen-
eral design or plan existing at the time, made 
as part of a general scheme to induce the sign-
ing of a paper or to make one act, as he other-
wise would not have acted, to his injury." 
[emphasis added] 
Certainly Stanley engaged in a general plan 
to have been able to induce 500 families and 20 fi-
nance companies to engage in his scheme. 
The disparity between the business experience 
of the Powells and of Pioneer is such as to meet the 
requirement of the Utah Supreme Court to the effect 
that the Appellants must show that they had a right 
to rely on Stanley and Pioneer as set forth in John-
son v Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 Pac 2d 134, 159 ALR 
256 (1945), and more recently in Reese v Harper, 
8 Utah 2d 119, 329 Pac 2d 410, ( 1958). Stanley 
and Pioneer were in business for many years. Stan-
ley sold merchandise to many individuals on a legi-
timate basis before he began his fraudulent under-
takings. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind 
that the Powells are young (24 years old) and 
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inexperienced in business (reared on rural Utah 
farms) [Def. Deposition p. 3] and that Stanley in-
duced them to join his scheme through the employ-
ment of a shill, namely, David Hunt, [Def. Deposi-
tion p. 4, 26, 28] who had been a life-long friend of 
Mr. Powell and who himself had been induced to 
join Stanley's scheme by an innocent friend. Mr. 
Hunt honestly told the Powells that Stanley had been 
in business for many years and was, therefore, not 
a fly-by-night operator. He also told the Powells 
honestly that Stanley had delivered furniture to him 
and was fulfilling his promise to make the finance 
company payments on his obligations. 
Lest there be an inclination to impute fraud to 
the Powells reference should be made to 23 Am 
J ur, Fraud and Deceit, Sec 182 where the following 
will be found: 
"Relief will often be granted to a party 
who was ignorant of the fact that a scheme 
was fraudulent and entered into it in reliance 
on the representations of the other party as 
to its honesty. 
"Equity often interferes for the relief of 
the less guilty of parties, where his trans-
gression has been brought about by the im-
position or undue influence of the party on 
whom the burden of the original wrong prin-
cipally rests." 
ARGUMENT THREE 
THE NOTE AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
SIGNED BY THE POWELLS WERE INDUCED 
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BY, WERE COLLATERAL TO, AND WERE 
TAINTED WITH THE FRAUD OF STANLEY'S 
PROMISES AND ARE UNENFORCEABLE BY 
PIONEER SINCE PIONEER BREACHED ITS 
STATUTORY DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH 
AND A VOID UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS. 
In Scow v Guardtone, 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 Pac 
2d 643 (1966) the Utah Supreme Court found the 
finance company was not relieved from the impact 
of Guardtone's fraudulent contracts merely because 
of the finance company's self serving disclaimer that 
the obligations to them were not affected by Guard-
tone's fraudulent contracts. (see 417 P2 at 644.) 
As in Guardtone, the case at bar is an "inte-
grated whole" ( 417 P2 at 644) with Stanley arrang-
ing for loans and sending his agent to accompany 
the Powells and others to finance company offices 
with a list of furniture and dollar amount in Stan-
ley's own handwriting [Def. Deposition p. 6] and 
supplying Pioneer with credit information. His own 
handwritten list of furniture upon which both the 
Powells and Pioneer relied may well be an integral 
part of the contract between the Powells and Pio-
neer. 
The reasons the Powells believe Pioneer had 
knowledge of Stanley's fraudulent activities are sum-
marized as follows : 
Pioneer had done business with Stanley for sev-
eral years, at first by buying his conditional sale 
contracts and later, when Pioneer learned something 
to make it fear Stanley's conditional sale contracts, 
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changed to executing notes and chattel mortgages di-
rectly with customers, such as the Powells, that Stan-
ley made appointments for. Pioneer knew Stanley 
was insolvent and had no inventory or credit, since 
between 1957 and 1964, fourteen suits for non-pay-
ment of debt were instituted against Stanley which 
resulted in eleven unsatisfied judgments, five of said 
judgments, all unsati.sjied, having been obtained by 
finance companies, one of which was in the amount of 
$30,000.00; they chose to disregard information re-
garding Stanley's business history and methods 
which was supplied to them by the Salt Lake Credit 
Bureau, Dun & Bradstreet, and by the "Lenders Ex-
change," a non-profit clearing house in Salt Lake 
County maintained by finance companies for the 
very purpose of supplying the finance companies 
with information about borrowers and about sellers 
whose paper Pioneer purchases; Pioneer knew from 
its considerable experience with Stanley customers 
that many items sold under his contracts were grossly 
overpriced; that the contracts covered color television 
sets, expensive stereo sets and some exotic items be-
yond the usual level of living of many of Stanley's 
customers; they knew Stanley was insolvent, and con-
sequently had no credit, and owned no inventory; sold 
from catalogues and floor samples and Pioneer knew 
that Stanley could not have made delivery of the 
furniture covered by the chattel mortgage at the 
time it was executed; Pioneer knew, even though 
Stanley was insolvent, that his business was large 
and "hopped" from one to another finance company 
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rather than being placed with one or a few of them 
which is the usual for furniture stores. 
Pioneer knew that all Stanley customers had 
perfect payment records with them. There was no 
delinquency either while Pioneer was taking assign-
ments of Stanley's conditional sale contracts nor 
during the last year or so before Stanley's bankrupt-
cy when Pioneer, along with all other finance com-
panies, with legal power to do so, shifted from pur-
chasing conditional sale contracts to making so-called 
"direct loans" with customers Stanley made appoint-
ments for. 
Pioneer hoped to insulate itself from whatever 
fraud Stanley might be perpetrating by changing 
from assignments to direct loans. Instead, Pioneer 
implicated itself even deeper in Stanley's fraud by 
becoming an immediate party rather than an as-
signee ; they acted with reckless disregard for the 
effect of Stanley's dealings on his unsophisticated 
customers. 
Pioneer breached the positive duty imposed up-
on it to conduct its affairs in good faith as set forth 
in Section 70A-1-203 U.C.A. and to heed notice as 
defined in Section 70A-1-201 (25): 
" ( 25) A person has 'notice' of a fact 
when 
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or 
(b) he has received a notice or notifica-
tion of it; or 
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( c) from all the facts and circumstances 
known to him at the time in question 
he has reason to know that it exists." 
[emphasis added] 
As stated in 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiv-
er, Sec. 80, 
"Good faith is generally regarded as exer-
cising reasonable diligence to learn the truth 
" 
Pioneer also breached its duty to avoid the exe-
cution of unconscionable contracts as set forth in 
Section 70A-2-302 U.C.A. The breach of which duty 
has been held in several recent cases as grounds for 
denying recovery by finance companies as shown in 
17 ALR 3d 1010 Sec. 57 as follows: 
"Uniform Commercial Code §2-302 (1) 
provides that if the court as a matter of law 
finds the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made the court may ref use to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the 
contract without the unconscionable clause, or 
it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscion-
able result. 
"Applying this provision, the courts have 
held in a number of cases that an unconscion-
able clause in a sales contract was unenforce-
able ... 
"In Frostifresh Corp v. Reynoso ( 1966) 
52 Misc 2d 26, 274 NYS 2d 757, a Spanish-
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speaking salesman sold a refrigerator-freezer 
to a husband and wife for a cash sales price of 
$900, plus a charge of $245.88. The cost of 
the refrigerator-freezer to the seller was $348. 
When the husband told the salesman that he 
had only 1 week left on his job and could not 
afford to buy the appliance, the salesman 
told them that the appliance would cost them 
nothing because they would be paid bonuses 
or commissions of $25 each on the numerous 
sales that would be made to their friends and 
neighbors. The retail contract was entirely 
in English, and was neither translated nor 
explained to the buyers. In granting judg-
ment against the buyers for only $348 with 
interest, less the $32 paid on account, the court 
said that the contract was unconscionable un-
der Code § 2-302 because the price and terms 
were shocking to the conscience. It pointed 
out that the service charge alone almost 
equaled the cost of the appliance and that 
the buyers were handicapped by a lack of 
knowledge both as to the commercial situation 
and as to the nature and terms of the con-
tract, which was submitted in a language for-
eign to them. [emphasis added] 
"Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maciver 
(1964) 105 NH 435, 201 A2d 886, 14 ALR 
2d 324, was relied on in State by Lefkowitz 
v !TM, Inc. ( 1966) 52 Misc 2d 39, 275 NYS2d 
303, in which the court enjoined the operation 
of a "referral-sales program" as unconscion-
able, finding specifically that the contracts 
entered into with buyers under the program 
were unconscionable under Code § 2-302 ( 1) . 
Under the plan, the consumer received a com-
mission for each prospect who was referred 
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by the consumer and who also made a pur-
chase. The promoters charged over $900 for 
a simple broiler, over $1,500 for a color tele-
vision set, and almost $1,000 for a vacuum 
cleaner. They made numerous misrepresenta-
tions as to the products involved, and, the 
court said, their plan had the vice and quick-
sand nature of all rndless-chain transactions. 
In finding that the contracts were unconscion-
able under Code § 2-302 ( 1), the court said 
that they were unconscionable because not 
only was the price unfair but also the con-
tracts were procured by deceptive practices." 
[emphasis added] 
The immediate profits including prepaid inter-
est, investigation fees, profit on insurance premiums, 
often amounting to from $200 to $500 on a single 
Stanley contract, plus the prompt payment records 
of Stanley customers (prompt because payments 
were made by Stanley himself) may well have in-
duced Pioneer's management to cast aside caution, 
"ride the balloon", and "take a chance" despite their 
knowledge of Stanley's insolvency and unsavory bus-
iness record. 
Pioneer took its chance with Stanley's unsavory 
business and enjoyed the high profits generated by 
Stanley's business for several years. In view of 
Pioneer's failure to abide by its statutory duty of 
care and failure to heed the most obvious signs of 
insolvency and fraud, surely Pioneer cannot now 
be allowed to shift its burden to innocent young peo-
ple who had neither the business experience nor ac-
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cess to the Lenders Exchange, the Salt Lake Credit 
Bureau or Dun & Bradstreet, all of which resources 
Pioneer had, to avoid an unconscionable contract. 
Pioneer may claim it did not know of Stanley's 
operations but under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Pioneer had a positive duty to act in good faith and 
avoid an unconscionable contra·ct. One of the most 
elementary principles of jurisprudence teaches that 
one does not fulfill a positive duty merely by clos-
ing his eyes thus avoiding to see the obvious. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A HOLDER IN 
DUE COURSE AND STANLEY'S FAILURE TO 
DELIVER THE PROMISED GOODS CONSTI-
TUTES A FAILURE OF A CONDITION PRECE-
DENT TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
POWELLS AND PIONEER. 
As stated in Sec. 70A-3-306, U.C.A. quoted in 
argument ONE above, since Pioneer is an "imme-
diate party" and not a holder in due course, the 
"nonperformance of any condition precedent" is 
available to the Powells as a defense against enforce-
ment of their contract with Pioneer. 
When taken as a whole, in the transaction be-
tween the Powells, M.A. Stanley, and Pioneer, there 
can be no doubt that the Powells fully expected Stan-
ley to deliver the furniture he promised to sell to 
them. Also in the absence of absolute fraud, on its 
part, Pioneer also expected Stanley to deliver. 
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Stanley's handwritten list of furniture (see Def. 
Deposition p. 6) with a dollar amount which was 
acted upon by Pioneer is part of Pioneer's file and 
may actually be a written part of the contract itself 
between the Powells and Pioneer. At the very least, 
the handwritten list is written evidence of what the 
condition precedent consisted of. Delivery of the 
furniture was certainly a cond'ition precedent to pay-
ment of money by the Powells under the contracts 
contemplated by both the Powells and Pioneer at the 
time the note and mortgage were executed. 
At Section 668, WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3d 
ed Page 152 has the following to say with respect to 
conditions: 
" ... Conditions may be created by the 
manifested assent of the parties thereto, or 
they may be created by the law from the terms 
or nature of the contract without any mani-
festation of assent to their creation. From this 
viewpoint, conditions fall into two broad 
classes: 
( 1) The express condition; and 
( 2) The constructive condition, also fre-
quently called a condition implied in law. 
In Ross v Harding, 391 P2 526 (1964) the Washing-
ton Supreme Court quoted WILLISTON favorably 
as follows: 
" [ 6] Whether a provision in a contr~ct 
is a condition, the nonfulfillment of which 
excuses performance, depends upon the intent 
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of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair 
and reasonable construction of the language 
used in the light of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 5 WILLISTON CONTRACTS 
(3rd ed) § 663 p. 127" [emphasis added] 
Lest it be thought that the law of condition prec-
edent applies only to a failure by a party to perform, 
see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, where in 
Chapter 10, Sec. 257, Comment "a" at page 367 the 
following will be found: 
"A condition may be a performance by a 
party to a contract or some other event. The 
condition may be the present existence of a 
fact or its future occurrence. The party may 
warrant or promise that the fact exists or 
shall occur or he may not so promise. Such a 
promise as in other cases, may be inf erred 
from conduct as well as stated in words." 
In the case at bar, the "other event" contem-
plated by the parties was the delivery of the furni-
ture by Stanley. 
See also Chapter 13, Section 395 of the RE-
STATEMENT, Comment "a": 
"Sections 250-325 (Chapters 10, 11) 
state the rules governing the requirements 
for a duty of immediate performance. A con-
ditional right to performance arises as soon 
as the contract is made, but the duty does not 
mature or become one of immediate perform-
ance until later. The condition must first 
occur, and the terms of the contract may re-
quire it to occur at a particular time or within 
a limited period .... " [emphasis added] 
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Stanley never delivered the furniture so the 
"condition" never occurred, and so the duty of the 
Powells to pay under their note is "not mature." 
11 Am Jur 2d BILLS AND NOTES § 664 
states: 
"664. Breach for conditional delivery or 
delivery for spe~ial purpose. 
"As between immediate parties, and as 
regards a remote party other than a holder 
in due course, delivery of an instrument may 
be shown to have been conditional, or for a 
special purpose only, and thus it is a defense 
as to such parties that an instrument was de-
livered on a condition precedent which has not 
been performed . . . " [emphasis added] 
In Cockrell v Taylor, 122 Fla 798, 165 So 887, 
105 ALR 1338 (1936) the Supreme Court of Florida 
cites at length the Utah Supreme Court in this 
Court's decision in Martineau v Hanson, 47 Utah 
549, 166 P 432, 433, (1916), as authority for the 
proposition that parole evidence may be used to es-
tablish that a note was manually delivered to an-
other on a condition precedent which failed and 
constituted a valid defense against collection of said 
note, as follows : 
"' "It is familiar law, notwithstanding 
some conflict in the authorities, that a person 
may manually deliver an instrument, though 
it be in the form of commercial paper, to an-
other, on its face containing a binding obliga-
tion in praesenti of such person to such other, 
with a contemporaneous verbal agreement 
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that it shall not take effect until the happen-
ing of some specified event; and that the 
paper as between the parties will have no 
validity as a binding contract till the condi-
tions shall have been satisfied; and that proof 
of such condition does not violate the rule that 
a written instrument cannot be varied by a 
contemporaneous parol agreement; that such 
evidence only goes to show that the instrument 
never had vitality as contract." 
" 'While the fact that the note in ques-
tion was delivered only upon the condition 
that it should not become a completed or en-
forceable contract unless the purchaser of the 
lands in question paid the sum stated is not 
as directly pleaded as it might have been, yet 
it seems clear to us that the condition is suf-
ficiently set forth, and that, as pleaded, it con-
stituted a condition precedent to the right of 
recovery on the note, and one which the parties 
could legally agree upon ... '" 
To the same general effect, see Glendo State 
Bank v Abbott Wyo. 216 Pac 700, 34 ALR 296 
( 1923) where the Wyoming Supreme Court said: 
"The plaintiff [bank] is named as payee 
in the note. At the trial it introduced the note, 
and rested. The defendant then introduced 
evidence tending to prove that he signed the 
note and delivered it to one Dix, who was 
soliciting subscriptions for shares of stock in 
a corporation called the Western Life & Cas-
ualty Company; that Dix took the note for 
the purpose of delivering it to that company, 
with the understanding that the company 
would issue and send to defendant 500 shares 
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of its capital stock, or return the note; that the 
defendant did not receive the shares of 
stock. ... " [emphasis added] 
Also see Franklin Discount Co. v Ford 27 NJ 
473, 143 A 2d 161, 73 ALR 2d 1316 (1958) where 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: 
"The effect of the eight lines reciting 
the consideration was to prohibit the defend-
ants from showing a contrary parol agree-
ment, a right which they would otherwise have 
under the Negotiable Instruments Law. The 
plaintiff was not a holder 1:n due course. Thus, 
the endorsers under R. S. 7 :2-16 NJSA might 
show a parol agreement that the delivery was 
conditional upon the extension of a new line 
of credit, or, what amounts to the same thing, 
under R. S. 7 :2-58, NJSA, that there was a 
failure of an agreed-upon consideration." 
[emphasis added] 
The list of furniture and dollar amount in Stan-
ley's own handwriting which was given to Pioneer at 
the time of execution of the note here sued upon and 
which is still in Pioneer's possession must clearly 
show that the note was executed by the Powells and 
delivered to Pioneer on the condition that the Powells 
would receive the listed furniture. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
PIONEER, NOT BEING A HOLDER OF AN 
INSTRUMENT IN DUE COURSE, THE NOTE 
AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE SIGNED BY THE 
POWELLS ON BEHALF OF PIONEER ARE 
VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE 
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POWELLS BECAUSE THE POWELLS RE-
CEIVED NO CONSIDERATION FOR SIGNING 
THEM. 
The Respondent, Pioneer, is not a holder in due 
course nor an innocent purchaser for value of the 
note upon which it now sues the Powells. In fact, 
Pioneer is an immediate party to the contract on 
which it sues. Accordingly, the provision of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, Section 70A-3-306 cited 
in Argument ONE above is applicable here and "the 
defense of want or failure of consideration" is avail-
able to the Powells. 
Black's Law Dictionary (Second Edition), West 
Publishing Company, 1910, defines consideration 
as follows: "CONSIDERATION. The inducement to 
a contract. The cause, motive, price, or impelling 
influence which induces a contracting party to enter 
into a contract. The reason or material cause of a 
contract." (Citations omitted.) 
M. A. Stanley made the appointment with Pio-
neer for the Powells to go to its office to borrow 
money to pay for furniture which Stanley promised 
to deliver to the Powells. The Powells delivered to 
Pioneer a list of furniture in Stanley's own handwrit-
ing showing a dollar amount to be charged for the 
furniture, which amount was the net amount ( exclu-
sive of interest and other charges) the Powells 
promised to pay Pioneer. That handwritten list is in 
the possession of Pioneer; it is part of the over-all 
contract and is written evidence that the Powells 
expected to receive furniture as consideration for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
promising to pay money to Pioneer. [see Def. Deposi-
tion p. 25, 26, 37, 38] The Powells were handed a 
check, prepared prior to their arrival on Stanley's 
telephone instructions. The check was payable to Mr. 
Powell and to M.A. Stanley. 
Since Pioneer is not a innocent purchaser for , 
value, and is in fact an immedjate contracting party, 
as stated in Section 70A-3-306 (b) U. C. A., the 
Powells may def end against collection of their note as 
"in an action on simple contract ... " 
The furniture contained in Stanley's list was , 
never delivered. Hence, the Powells did not receive 
the "cause, motive, or impelling influence which in-
duced them to enter into the contract," to pay money 
to Pioneer as required by Black's definition of con-
sideration. 
While it is true that Pioneer gave a check to the 
Powells, the check was consciously designed by Pio-
neer to be worthless to the Powells. The check could 
not be converted into money or anything else of value 
by the Powells themselves. 
If it be contended that delivery of the check which 
the Powells could not cash was consideration for 
their entering into a contract to pay money to Pio-
neer, then that check was delivered for a "special 
purpose" viz., to be re-delivered to Stanley with no 
value in itself to the Powells. 
Since the Powells received nothing of value 
to them for contracting to pay money to Pioneer, the 
Powells' promise to pay said money is unenforceable 
I 
I 
_...! 
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against them for want or failure of consideration. 
This principle is illustrated by WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS, illustration No. 3, Sec. 167, Sub 1: 
"A [Stanley] has a bilateral contract 
with B [the Powells] in which the promises 
are dependent. A [Stanley] assigns his rights 
thereunder to C [Pioneer], who informs B 
[the Powells] of the assignment. Thereafter, 
A [Stanley] wholly fails to perform his own 
duties under the bilateral contract. C [Pio-
neer] has no right against B. [the Powells] 
" 
The foregoing rule is cited in Thorp Finance Cor-
poration v LeMire 264 Wis 220, 58 NW 2d 641, 44 
ALR 2d 189 ( 1953) and is shown by ALR to have 
considerable authority since its Editors cite cases in 
support of that same legal proposition from Alaba-
ma, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Following the above citations, 
ALR 44 2d summarizes the law at page 32 as fol-
lows: 
"Thus a dealer's fraudulent misrepresen-
tations as to the condition and value of an 
automobile in selling it to the defendant con-
stituted a defense available to the defendant 
purchaser as against a trans! eree of the note 
and conditional sale contract, where the latter 
was not an innocent purchaser for value. Com-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
mercial Credit Co. v. Childs ( 1940) 199 Ark , 
1073, 137 SW 2d 260, 128 ALR 726." 
If a misrepresentation by the seller as to the 
condition of the product sold is a defense against the 
finance company which was not a holder in due 
course, surely failure of the seller to deliver anything 
must be a defense available to the Powells here. 
To hold that the Powells must pay the amount 
called for in the note when they did not receive the 
furniture which induced them to enter the contract, 
would be to clothe Pioneer with the special attributes 
of a holder in due course or an innocent purchaser 
for value while in fact, Pioneer is merely an imme-
diate contracting party. 
That defense of failure of consideration is a 
defense against collection of the Powells' note by 
Pioneer is also clearly illustrated in Mutual Finance 
Company v Martin, 63 So 2d 649, 44 ALR 2d 1, 7 
( 1953) wherein the Supreme Court of Florida cites 1 
the Supreme Court of California: 
"See also Commercial Credit Corp. v. • 
Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal 2d 
766, 214 P 2d 819, 822 (1950), where the 
Supreme Court of California said: 
" 'When a finance company actively par-
ticipates in a transaction of this type from ' 
its inception, counseling and aiding the future 
vendor-payee, it cannot be regarded as a hold-
er in due course of the note given in the tr.ans-
action and the defense of failure of consid~r­
ation may properly be maintained. Machine 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---
33 
Works never obtained the press for which it 
bargained and, as against Commercial, there 
is no more obligation upon it to pay the note 
than there is to pay the installments specified 
in the contract.'" [emphasis added] 
The Florida Court continued: 
"To paraphrase the last sentence of the 
above quotation to fit the instant case, 'Mar-
tin never obtained the deep freezer he bar-
gained for, and as against the finance com-
pany there is no more obligation upon him to 
pay the note than there is to pay the install-
ments specified in the conditional bill of 
sale.' " 
Similarly, in A. A. Murphy, Inc. v Banfield, 
Oklahoma, 363 P 2d 942, (1961) Murphy, the finance 
company, endeavored to collect on a note executed 
by Mr. and Mrs. Bogard to join in a "food freezer 
plan." After finding that the finance company was 
not a holder in due course, the false promises by the 
"Plan" salesman and the "Plan's" failure to deliver 
the freezer promised, were defenses against collec-
tion of the note by the finance company. Speaking for 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Berry, Justice, 
states: 
"Since plaintiff is not a holder in due 
course, the provisions of 48 0.S. 1951 § 127, 
are applicable, and defendant buyers could in-
terpose as against it all defenses available be-
tween themselves and the payee (Banfield) . 
" [ 10] Apart from failure of considera-
tion, defendants' principal reliance for rescis-
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sion was placed upon fraud in the procure-
ment of the notes and mortgages. The evidence 
in su:ppo~t of this issue is likewise undisputed. 
Banfield s agents (whose authority was not 
de?ied) represented that a new Markett re-
frigerator-freezer combination unit would be 
deliver.ed; ... Later a secmidhand freezer box 
of a different make was delivered .... De-
fendants did not know the terms of the note 
until they checked the chattel mortgage on 
file and received a statement of payments 
from plaintiff finance company ... This con-
duct, as we view it, was not incompatible with 
nor did it preclude equitable rescission. Frick~ 
enschmidt v Garner, 17 4 Okl 559, 51 P 2d 
537; Davis v Gwaltney, Okl 291 P 2d 820. 
"In an action on a promissory note by 
one who is not a holder in due course, both 
fraud in the procurement of the note and ab-
sence or failure of consideration are valid de-
fenses." [emphasis added] 
It seems clear from the foregoing that failure 
of consideration is a defense available to the Powells 
against Pioneer since Pioneer is not a holder in due 
course, and the Powells did not receive the furniture. 
ARGUMENT SIX 
THOUGH THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE EX· 
ECUTED BY THE POWELLS RECITED THAT 
THEY HAD RECEIVED DELIVERY OF THE 
FURNITURE FROM STANLEY, THE POWELLS· 
ARE NOT NOW ESTOPPED TO SET UP STAN· 
LEY'S FAILURE TO PERFORM AS A DEFENSE 
AGAINST PAYMENT OF THE NOTE NOR 
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DOES THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE PRE-
VENT THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
TO ESTABLISH WANT OR FAILURE OF CON-
SIDERATION. 
Though it is true that the chattel mortgage 
signed by the Powells included "small print" stating 
that the Powells had possession of the goods being 
purchased from Stanley and pledged to Pioneer, the 
evidence will also show that when the Appellants 
went to the finance company offices in company with 
Stanley's agent, Hazel Stulsky, "everything was 
ready"; finance company personnel had all or most 
of the papers made out in advance; Stanley had al-
ready supplied credit information. [Def. Deposition 
p. 13, 35, 36] 
The procedures were "rushed" taking only 15 
to 20 minutes for completion. The Appellants did 
not have time to read and comprehend the chattel 
mortgage they signed. No effort was made to explain 
the nature of the papers signed by the Powells at 
the finance company office. [Def. Deposition p. 36, 
37] 
Citing again the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
in Thorp Finance Corporation v LeMire, 264 Wis 
220, 58 NW 2d 641 (1953) where that court points 
out at 44 ALR 2d 189 in a footnote citing Am Jur 
Estoppel § 39: 
"The proper function of equitable estop-
pel is the prevention of fraud, actual or con-
structive, and the doctrine should always be 
so applied as to promote the end of justice and 
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accomplish that which ought to be done be-
tween man and man. Such an estoppel cannot 
arise against a party except when justice to 
the rights of others demands it and when to 
refuse it would be inequitable." 
Though in LeMire, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court was dealing with an assigned contract rather 
than a note and chattel mortgage, since it found the 
finance company not to be holder in due course, and 
since Pioneer is not such a holder in this case, the 
principles enunciated in LeMire are applicable here. 
In LeMire, the court went on to say at 44 ALR 2d 
189: 
"The finance company would be pre-
vented from invoking estoppel against LeMire, 
based upon the recital of delivery of the mer· 
chandise, if the finance company, at the time 
it purchased LeMire's contract, was not act-
ing in good faith and exercising due diligence. 
The law with respect to this is well stated in 
19 Am Jur, Estoppel 739, 741, sec 86: 
" ' ... Good faith is generally regarded, 
however, as requiring the exercise of reason-
able diligence to learn the truth, and accord· 
ingly estoppel is denied where the party 
claiming it was put on inquiry as to the ~ri.d/1 
and had available means for ascertaining 
it .... ' 
" ... The trial court made a statement in 
the record after counsel for the plaintiff had 
moved for a directed verdict explaining the 
court's reasons for granting such motion. I.n 
such statement the trial court declared that it 
would be a violation of the parol evidence rule 
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to permit LeMire to prove that the furniture 
being purchased by him from Stoltz had never 
been delivered when the contract itself re-
cited such delivery." [emphasis added] 
The Court in LeMire then cites Jones, EVI-
DENCE, COMMENTARIES, (2d Ed) p 2859, Sec 
1563, with respect to the parol evidence rule as fol-
lows: 
"We point out in preceding sections that 
evidence extrinsic to a writing which goes in 
legal avoidance of the entire writing or agree-
ment is admissable. When entire want of con-
sideration is pleaded, or offered to be shown 
under such form of pleading as may warrant 
such showing, the offer of proof goes to an 
avoidance of the entire agreement and to show 
that the writing is without legal force. The 
same is true where failure or consideration 
is set up. It is immaterial whether the attempt 
be regarded as one to establish fraud or mere-
ly as going to the matter of performance and 
enforceability. Viewed in either aspect, the 
substantive law recognizes a remedy, and that 
remedy goes to the very existence of the writ-
ing as a legally effective and enforceable 
thing. It goes, not in contradiction of any 
term, but to the entirety. Thus in actions on 
bills and notes or other contracts the defense 
is frequently interposed, and proved by means 
of extrinsic evidence that the agreement was 
without consideration, or that the considera-
tion has failed. The same applies to bills of 
sale, releases and other writings. And the 
recital in an adoption not under seal of the 
receipt of consideration may be contradicted 
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for ~he purpose of showing the inyalidity of 
the mstrument for want of consideration" 
[emphasis added] · 
Volume 44 ALR 2d 205 shows additional in. 
stances in which obligor was not estopped to prove 
failure of consideration by parole despite the ob. 
ligor's prior acknowledgement of receipt of the prop-
erty and cites Parker v Funk, 185 Cal 347, 197 P 83, 
44 ALR 2d 205 ( 1921) as follows: 
" ... where the defendant had executed 
a conditional sale contract covering the pur-
chase of property described as 'one Ameston 
truck unit and Ford automobile, Motor No. 
17577717,' and had acknowledged therein re-
ceipt of 'said property,' and that it was in good 
condition and repair, but the fact was that 
the contract covered the purchase of a truck 
which was to be constructed by the vendor out 
of a Ford automobile then in his possession 
and a certain truck unit which was to be at· 
tached thereto, and the vendor had not com-
pleted and delivered the truck when the con-
tract was signed and in fact never did deliver 
it, the defendant purchaser was held not es· 
topped by contract or in pais, by such acknowl· 
edgement of receipt of the property, to defend 
an assignee's action upon the conditional 
sales contract on the ground that the vendor 
had never delivered the completed truck to 
him and that his liability was conditional up· 
on such delivery rather than absolute as in· 
dicated by the contract. The court viewed the 
conditional purchaser's recital or receipt of 
the property as being, in this instance, merely 
a recital of receipt of the consideration, not 
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intended to be acted upon by a transferee of 
the contract, and not barring the defendant 
chattel purchaser from showing as against 
the assignee that the consideration has failed. 
The holding that there was no estoppel by con-
tract was placed upon the ground that the ac-
knowledgement of receipt of the described 
property was in effect but an acknowledge-
ment of receipt of the consideration for the 
contract, and that it is always open to a party 
to dispute the recital of a consideration." 
[emphasis added] 
To a similar effect, the Annotation cites Amer-
ican Nat. Bank v A. G. Somerville, Inc. ( 1923) 191 
Cal 364, 216 P 376; General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v Whitehead ( 1931) 1963 SC 236, 161 SE 494, 
Southwest Contract Pu'f'<chase Corp. v McGee (1947 
Tex Civ App) 296 SW 912, Judgment affd 120 Tex 
240, 36 SW 2d 978; MaUis v Lounsbury (1927) 193 
Wis 531, 214 NW 332 and Geocaris v Carell,as 
(1912) 174 Ill app 232. 
Despite the "small print" in the chattel mort-
gage acknowledging possession of the furniture 
promised by Stanley, under the circumstances, the 
Powells are not now estopped to deny that they ever 
received that furniture. 
ARGUMENT SEVEN 
THE CASE AT BAR IS NOT PROPERLY A 
SUBJECT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE 
THE PLEADINGS OF THE DEFENDANTS AL-
LEGE FRAUD IN THE INDUCEMENT AND 
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION, BOTH OF 
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WHICH ARE FACTUAL ISSUES TO BE DETER. 
MINED BY THE TRIER OF THE FACTS. 
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
I 
Summary Judgment, states in part: 
" ... The judgment sought shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions 
and admission~ on file, together with the affi'. 
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any niaterial fact and that the mov-
ing party is entitled to a judgment as a nwtter 
of law. A summery judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue 
of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages." 
The Complaint alleges that the Powells owe Pio-
neer $1,679.00 based on a note and chattel mortgage 
executed by the Powells for Pioneer. Pioneer is not 
and does not claim to be a holder of the note in due 
course. Consquently, fraud in the inducement and 
failure of consideration are available to the Powells 
against Pioneer's attempt to collect thereon and both 
are questions of fact. 
The Powells' Affidavit states that they received 
no consideration for their note, (R 13) and their 
Answer states that Stanley defrauded them by in· 
ducing them to sign the note in furtherance of his 
fraudulent scheme. (R 10) It seems clear that Stan· 
ley's fraudulent scheme was collateral to the very 
commercial paper he induced the Appellants to sign 
for Pioneer Finance Company. 
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The facts as alleged therefore clearly place this 
case within the scope of Scow v Guardtone 18 Utah 
2d 135,417 Pac 2d 643 ( 1966) where at 417 Pac 
2d 645 the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"We turn to a consideration of the rights 
of the Assignee, the Defendant, Prudential 
Federal Savings. It is pertinent to observe that 
the fraud, having been established to avoid 
the contract with Guardtone, the burden of 
showing it was an innocent purchaser for 
value, was upon Prudential ... " 
and at 646: 
"From the facts recited herein, it is our 
opinion that there was a basis in the evidence 
upon which the jury could fairly and reason-
ably refuse to believe that the Defendant, 
Prudential Federal, was an innocent purchas-
er and which forced the conclusion that it was 
bound by the judgment rescinding the con-
tract for fraud." 
Though Stanley has not actually been sued by 
the Powells because he cannot respond in damages, 
and the law does not require the doing of futile acts, 
there can be small doubt that the Powells could pre-
vail against him on the basis of his failure to deliver 
the furniture he promised and on his fraudulent 
promises to them. If so, Pioneer's collateral note 
would be unenforceable against the Powells under 
the Guardtone rule. 
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Under Rule 56 ( c) all the allegations in the 
Complaint must be uncontroverted by the defendant 
before it would be appropriate to issue a summary 
judgment against the defendants. It seems clear 
that under the law enunciated in Scow v Guardtone 
I 
supra, the Answer alleges facts, which if true, state 
a valid defense to the Complaint. 
If there bP doubt that Stanley's promises were 
collateral to the Powell's contract to pay money to 
Pioneer, it should be remembered that the list of 
furniture and dollar amount in Stanley's handwrit-
ing is now and from the beginning has been in Pio-
neer's files. 
The furniture listed by Stanley was copied onto 
the Chattel Mortgage and the dollar amount shown 
in Stanley's handwriting was the amount of the net 
proceeds of the note and the amount of the check is-
sued by Pioneer showing Stanley as a payee. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded, with instructions 
as to the governing law, for trial of the facts by a 
jury to determine whether the Appellants were in 
fact fraudulently induced to enter into their contract 
with the Respondent; whether their contract con-
templated delivery of furniture to the Appellants as 
a condition precedent to the ripening of their obliga· 
tion under their note; whether the Respondent had 
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sufficient notice, but failed to fulfill its statutory 
duty to act in good faith and avoid an unconscion-
able contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, TOPHAM 
&HARDING 
Attorneys at Law 
JUSTIN C. STEW ART 
Attorneys for 
Appellants 
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